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Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:
An Historic Step Forward
Arthur Kinoy*
The historic decision last June by the Supreme Court in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.,' reasserting for the first time in almost 100
years the constitutional mandate in the thirteenth amendment to
abolish the badges and indicia of human slavery from all aspects of
American society, 2 has begun to meet with sharp criticism. 3 This is, of
course, no surprise. One might expect outcries from quarters of the
country in which the far less abrasive vocabulary of Brown v. Board
of Education4 still evokes memories of "Black Monday," "massive
resistance" and "interposition. ' 5 What is perhaps more surprising is
that the current attack on Jones emanates from the home territory of
Wendell Phillips, William Lloyd Garrison and Charles Sumner.
It has recently been suggested in the Harvard Law Review that
the Court in Jones was "carried away by opportunity and
*

Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law; A.B., Harvard College; LL.B., Columbia

University.
1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the majority of the
Court. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 444. Mr. Justice Harlan
wrote a dissenting opinion joined in by Mr. Justice White. Id. at 449.
2. Id. at 439. The opinion of the Court embraces the analysis of the sweep of the
thirteenth amendment set forth in the Civil Rights Cases. There both the majority opinion
of Justice Bradley and the dissenting opinion of the first Justice Harlan agreed that the
Emancipation Amendment was not restricted to a narrow abolition of human slavery, but rather
affirmatively embodied a broad "charter of liberty," which enacted "universal freedom" and
abolished all "badges and incidents of slavery" as well as the institution of slavery itself. 109
U.S. 3, 20-26, 35-36, 43 (1883).
3. See Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV.

L. REV. 63 (1968).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The "vocabulary" of Brown v. Board of Education is grounded
in the conceptual arena of "equal protection of the laws" and avoids any discussion of the interrelationship of racial segregation to the remaining influences of the outlawed system of slavery. I
have discussed elsewhere the serious problems which flowed from the failure of the original
Brown opinions to articulate squarely the nature and genesis of the rights involved in striking
down a system of racially segregated education. See Kinoy, The ConstitutionalRight of Negro
Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387 (1967); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
445 (Douglas, J., concurring opinion): "Some badges of slavery remain today. While the
institution has been outlawed, it has remained in the minds and hearts of many white men.
Cases which have come to this Court depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die. . . .They
[Negroes] have been made to attend segregated and inferior schools ....
5. See, for example, the "Southern Manifesto," signed by almost all of the then
Congressmen from the Southern states. 102 CONG. REC. 3948 (1956).
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temptation" to overreach its proper constitutional role by giving "the
country statutes which no Congress ever enacted." ' Moreover, in the
traditional foreword to the Harvardsummary of the work in the 1967
term, Professor Henkin goes on to characterize the constitutional
restatement of the sweep of the thirteenth amendment as a "virtuoso
performance," unnecessary and by clear implication unwise.' I
disagree. I would suggest, as I have previously, 8 that it is impossible
to overstate the potentially profound importance to the nation of this
bold and courageous reaffirmation of historical realities and legal
concepts which have lain buried for years under the conceptual rubble
of the 1877 betrayal of the first Reconstruction. In sharp contrast to
the recent Harvard criticism, it would seem to me that in reminding
the country that " 'by its own unaided force and effect the Thirteenth
Amendment abolished slavery and established universal freedom' "
and in reaffirming congressional power to "pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States," the Court, in the words of Mr. Justice Clark
concurring in Baker v. Carr, was acting in its "greatest tradition.""'
And I would suggest further that when the Court in phrases of grim
reality characterized the *"herding" together of black men, women
and children into the great urban ghettos of America as a "relic of
slavery,"" it was reaching out to its ultimate and most important role
as a teacher and keeper of the conscience of society. I would defend
the proposition once ad,.anced by Justice Brandeis that in the deepest
sense judges cannot escape their responsibilities as teachers of men.
The frank recognition that the overwhelming problems of
contemporary America in relation to its black citizens are related to
the failure of our society for over 100 years to eliminate the pervading

6. Henkin, supra note 3, at 83.
7. Id. at 87.
8. See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Sonic First
Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Conpany, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 537 (1968).
9. See generally Kinoy, supra note 4. In this article I have suggested that the Bradley
majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883 developed a legal theory predicted upon a
concept of a "secondary" and -corrective" thrust of the fourteenth amendment which

established a juridical rationale for the earlier 1877 political decisions to abandon primary
national responsibility for the enforcement of the new rights granted to the race of freedmen. In
respect to the national significance of the 1877 political decisions, see generally C. VANN
WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION (1951). See also K. STANiPP. THE ERA Or
RECONSTRUCTION,

10.
11.

1865-1877 (1965).

369 U.S. 186, 262 (1962).
392 U.S. at 442-43.
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influences of a supposedly dead social institution-the system of
slavery-can be of enormous importance in the difficult days ahead.
In its simplest terms the Supreme Court in Jones proclaimed an
historical truth which no organ of responsible leadershipgovernmental,
political,
cultural
or
scientific-has
been
willing to acknowledge publicly for almost 100 years: that the
structure of human slavery was never fully uprooted in this country
and that America's black citizens continue to be oppressed by the
remaining existence of the badges and indicia of the supposedly
outlawed system. This profound understanding which the Jones case
expressed-that the "herding" of black men, women and children
into the great urban ghettos is a "relic of slavery' ' 2 and thus
prohibited by the commands of the thirteenth amendment-has
enormous constitutional implications for the future of American
society. If the fundamental problems of the black ghettos are in truth
"relics" of the slave system, they are subject to the full and plenary
power of the national government. The thirteenth amendment, as the
Court reminded the nation last June, " 'by its own unaided force and
effect . . .abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.' ,,"3
This new national right of freedom for the black man and his children
was no narrow manumission from bondage. It was a charter of
"universal freedom" which carried with it the right of the race of
freedmen to be henceforth free from the stamp of inferiority imposed
by the "badges and indicia" of the institution of human slavery.
Accordingly, as the Court carefully pointed out, the Congress has the
full power "to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all
' 4 If
badges and indicia of slavery in the United States.'"
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 439; c.'.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
392 U.S. at 439. In Jones the Court reasserted the conclusions of the congressional en-

actors that "Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to decide what
are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into

effective legislation." Id. at 440. The further question, as to whether the amendment reaches
beyond constitutional authorization for legislative action, the Court specifically reserved for
another day. Mr. Justice Stewart carefully limited the holding of Jones to the precise question of
constitutional authorization for congressional action to eliminate the badges and indicia of
slavery, pointing out that "whether or not the Amendment itself did any more . . . [is] a

question not involved in this case." Id. at 439. 1 have suggested elsewhere that this question, left
open in Jones, as to whether the amendment is "self-executing"-as the Bradley opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883), would clearly imply-is critically important to an
unfolding of both a judicial and executive role in the future enforcement of the now reasserted

mandate of the amendment to root out the vestiges of slavery from all areas of American life.
See generally Kinoy, supra note 8.

In Jones the Court finds its precedential authority for its

reading of the thirteenth amendment in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Both the
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discrimination in housing is, as the Court so characterized it, a "relic
of slavery" and if it perpetrates the "badge" of inferiority, which was
the hallmark of the slavery system, then every branch of government
has the power and indeed the duty to eradicate it from all areas of
national life.
Ever since the turning point opinions of the Supreme Court in
the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, which marked the emergence of a legal
rationale for justifying the political decisions of 1877 abandoning the
promises of Radical Reconstruction and withdrawing national protection for the newly emancipated race, 5 the Court has avoided discussing
the problems of black citizens in terms of the continuing impact of the
slave system. This has created enormous conceptual problems as the
Court has struggled in recent years to redefine the frontiers of
constitutional power in this most critical of areas.' But this
reluctance to acknowledge the historical roots of these contemporary
problems lies deep in our national heritage. In a certain sense, all
American society has acted out a charade for over 100 years. Neither
the governing institutions nor the majority of the white population of
the country has been willing to face the incredible reality of American
history: the unspoken truth that a nation with such high pretensions
to world leadership in science, in culture, and in democratic
government could have tolerated for so long in every section of the
country and in every aspect of its national existence, customs,
practices, and a way of life inherited from a system of social
organization long condemned by the entire civilized world. Yet this
was and is the harsh and naked fact which conditions so much of
contemporary American society. But this central historical fact-that
the social system of slavery was never fully uprooted and that its
badges and indicia continue to mark the black man with the hallmark
of slavery, the stamp of an "inferior race"'"-has been buried deep in
our national consciousness. It is an unpleasant and upsetting fact, one
which is easier submerged than recognized, easier ignored than
acknowledged. For almost a century in every area of national
existence-political, social, cultural, and even the historical
sciences-we have chosen to act blandly as if the abrasive truth was
nonexistent.
majority and dissenting opinions in that case were in agreement that the thirteenth amendment
"isundoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation." 109 U.S. at 20.
15. See note 9 supra.
16. See, e.g., the discussion of the evolution and development of the "state action"
concept in Kinoy, supra note 4, at 414.
17. Id. at 410-14.
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Accordingly it is impossible, I would suggest, to overstate the
potentially profound importance of this first formal recognition by the
Court that the most pressing domestic problems today, erupting from
the cauldrons which are our urban and rural ghettos, are "relics" of
the slave system and the results of the continued existence of "badges
and indicia" of the supposedly banned way of life. The Court for the
first time since Reconstruction has brushed aside the camouflage
rhetoric accumulated over the past decades and bluntly has
characterized "the racial discrimination . . . [which] herds men into
ghettos" as a "relic of slavery." The potential significance of this
formulation lies even beyond the enormous legal and constitutional
implications which flow from this recognition of historical reality.
The profound understanding reflected in the Jones decision-that the
vast disturbing problems which are erupting from the black ghettos of
America, urban and rural, are a direct consequence of white
America's failure to uproot the vestiges and remains of the barbaric
system of human slavery-places these questions in the only
perspective which will allow of their solution short of an expanding
series of catastrophes and cataclysms which could well destroy the
8
nation.
This understanding that the gigantic problems of black poverty,
discrimination and second-class citizenship flow directly from the
failure to enforce and to implement the national commitment, 100
years old, to abolish the slave system creates a context for examining
these questions which once and for all settles all issues of priority.
There can be no debate, no "weighing and balancing" of competing
values, no counterposing of national projects of exploration of space
or asserted overseas commitments when the issue is the nation's
survival. And this is the issue when questions involve the century-old
obligation to burn out from the land all remnants of the system of
human slavery. The ultimate value judgment that the nation cannot
survive half-slave and half-free was not made in these last years in the
smoky days of Watts, Newark, Detroit and Washington. It was made
100 years ago and embedded in the fundamental law of the land. Thus
the frank recognition by the Court that the fundamental problem of
the herding together of black men, women and children into the great
ghettos of America is a remnant of the supposedly outlawed system of
human slavery can illuminate every facet of the complex questions
18. See generally REPORT
(1968).

OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
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which so trouble the country. The elimination of the inferior status
which characterizes the black citizen's position in housing,
employment, education and the administration of justice, within such
a context, can only be viewed as a national crisis question requiring
the highest priority and total commitment of every national resource.
In this sense the pronouncements of the Court in the Jones opinion
sweep far beyond the important legal and constitutional doctrines they
augur. In response to what is perhaps the most fundamental role of
the Court in our system of government-to be the ultimate teacher
and reminder of those first axioms without adherence to which a
democratic society cannot survive-the Court has sharply placed the
most pressing problems of contemporary American society into a
framework which can compel immediate national concern and
national action.
This forthright reaffirmation by the Court of the national
commitment to eradicate all vestiges of the system of slavery, its badges
and indicia, from American life occurs at a particulary critical moment
in our history. The pressures which led in 1877 to a wholesale abandonment of the solemn promises, made only a decade earlier, of
equality and freedom for the emancipated race are once again gathering
to impose a potential new "1877" upon the nation. From every quarter
pressures are now mounting to force the national government to retreat
from the position of affirmative responsibility for the enforcement of the
rights of black citizens, which had slowly reemerged in the period of
black upsurge and national rethinking stimulated by the seminal
decision in 1954 of Brown v. Board of Education. A concerted effort
is now underway to shift emphasis away from federal enforcement in
the area of equality in education 9 and employment."0 A year after the
19. The efforts to undermine an effective federal role in enforcing desegregation of
educationdl facilities centers around attempts to minimize or eliminate implementation of Title

VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which empowers federal agencies to withhold funds from
school districts which fail to comply with desegregation standards. The utilization of federal
power under Title VI to enforce Health, Education and Welfare Department "guidelines," cj.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. deied, 389
U.S. 840 (1967), has come increasingly under attack from congressional sources. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1969, at 16, col. I: "Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican of
South Carolina, has been particularly active since the election in trying to thwart federal fund

cut-offs from threatened districts." There have been recent indications that the executive branch
is reconsidering the entire approach to an affirmative federal sanction role, such as the warnings
of the outgoing Attorney-General as to the impact of any lessening of federal enforcement of
HEW guidelines. New York Times, Jan. 7, 1969, at I, col. 6. See also 115 CONG. REc. S1162
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1969); 115 CONG. REC. S1169 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1969) (statement by
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National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reported a critical
division of urban society into "separate and unequal" communities

and proposed a massive program of national effort to avert an
impending disaster, 2' an equally eminent Commission has only recently

reported that no substantial efforts have been undertaken on a
national scale to meet this crisis and that the situation has, if
2
anything, deteriorated sharply

It is at such a turning-point moment that the constitutional
concepts boldly enunciated in Jones assume critical importance.

Underlying the historic reassertion of the profound commitments
contained in the "charter of universal freedom" enacted in the

thirteenth amendment is a renewed recognition that the constitutional
right of black freedom is a nationally created right. As I have earlier

suggested, 3 the constitutional implications which flow from such a
recognition are sweeping in their implications for contemporary
America. The national commitment to guarantee that the children of

the freedmen be raised from the slavery-imposed status of

24
"inferior" beings, so candidly described in Dred Scott v. Sandbrd,

to the status of free and equal participants in the hitherto white

"political community" which constitutes the "people of the United

States"

2

5

imposes an affirmative duty upon all governments, state and

national, to enforce this "charter of universal freedom."" Upon each
coordinate branch of the national government-legislative, executive

and judicial-rests a primary affirmative responsibility, under the first
principles of federalism, to protect and implement the nationally

Secretary Finch, Department of Health, Education and Welfare); McGill, Listen Please, Sec.
Finch, Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 4, 1969, at 1, col. I.
20. Federal enforcement efforts in the field of discrimination against employment have
also been increasingly under sharp attack. See, for example, the three-part series of articles in
Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly, Dec. 23, 1968, Jan. 20, 1969 and Feb. 24,
1969, setting forth in great detail the mounting criticism of federal enforcement efforts in this
area by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance.
21. Note l8supra.
22. See URBAN COALITION AND URBAN AMERICA, INC., ONE YEAR LATER (1969). The
report concluded inter alia: "If the commission is equally correct about the long run, the nation
in its neglect may be sowing the seeds of unprecedented future disorder and division. For a year
later, we are a year closer to being two societies, black and white, increasingly separate and
scarcely less unequal."
23. See Kinoy, supra note 4.
24. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
25. Id. at 404-0f
26. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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created right of black freedomY Since McCulloch v. Maryland" it is

beyond question that the Congress has both the power and the
obligation to take all "appropriate" steps to enforce the right of

black men and women granted by the "charter of universal freedom"
to be free from the stigma of inferiority in all areas of life inherited
from the now outlawed system of human slavery. Under the
Constitution the executive branch has the independent affirmative
duty to utilize the full panoply of its constitutional and statutorily

invested powers to enforce this nationally created right. And I would
suggest that it has become equally clear that the national courts have,
under the Constitution, the power and the duty to utilize the full

sweep of federal judicial power to affirmatively protect this nationally
created right of black citizens to be once and forever free from the

burdens of remaining concepts of racial inferiority which pervade
every.area of American life. 9

In an earlier period it was the Court which provided the rationale
for the abandonment for almost a century of the premise of

affirmative national responsibility for the elimination of the vestiges
of the slave system from American life. It is an interesting
commentary upon the resiliency and unique importance of the

institution that in the present period it is the Court which reasserts
27. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
29. An eloquent statement of the sweep of this affirmative responsibility on all branches of
government to eradicate all the "relics" of slavery is contained in the opinion of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840, 872-73. (1967): "Brown's broad meaning, its important
meaning, is its revitalization of the national constitutional right the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments created in favor of Negroes. This is the right of Negroes to national
citizenship, their right as a class to share the privileges and immunities only white citizens had
enjoyed as a class. Brown erased Dred Scott, used the Fourteenth Amendment to breathe life
into the Thirteenth and wrote the Declaration of Independence into the Constitution. Freedmen
are free men. They are created as equal as are all other American citizens and with the same
unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. No longer 'beings of an inferior
race'--the Dred Scott article of faith-Negroes too are part of 'the people of the United States.'
"A primary responsibility of federal courts is to protect nationally created constitutional
rights. A duty of the States is to give effect to such rights-here, by providing equal educational
opportunities free of any compulsion that Negroes wear a badge of slavery. The States owe this
duty to Negroes, not just because every citizen is entitled to be free from arbitrary
discrimination as a heritage of the common law or because every citizen may look to his state
for equal protection of the rights a state grants its citizens. As Justice Harlan clearly saw in the
Civil Rights Cases (1883) . . .the Wartime Amendnents created an affirmative duty that the
States eradicate all relics, 'badges and indicia of slaveryi' lest Negroes as a race sink back into
'second-class' citizenship. "
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those concepts which can stand if implemented as a barrier to a second,
and this time even more disastrous, retreat from national responsibility
for the enforcement of the unfulfilled promises of freedom and equality
for the black citizens of this country. It has become rather fashionable in
some quarters to be sharply critical of the Court. Criticism of the
institution by the legal profession is, of course, a right and a duty, but it
carries with it a correlative obligation to support and defend the
institution when it performs its most historic role of unflinchingly
restating the constitutional premises upon which a democratic society
rests, especially when the restatement touches the raw nerve of public
sensitivity. By reminding the nation that the impending crises arising
out of the erupting urban and rural ghettos flow from the pervasive
impact for more than 100 years of the remnants of the system of human
slavery, the Court has performed an extraordinary service consistent
with its highest duties in the constitutional system. It is now.the responsibility of the other branches to rise to the challenge implicit in
Jones and to take those drastic measures necessary to meet the affirmative responsibility of government to enforce the "charter of universal
freedom."

